The Preparation of the National Intelligence Organization for July 15

It is evident that in the 2010s, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) acquired the capacity to direct and manage military operations both domestically and internationally. It is known that on July 15, a special operations unit/operation unit was formed by retired Staff Colonel Sadık Üstün and retired Colonel Kemal Eskintan, consisting of individuals and groups they approved. The activities of this unit at Akıncı Air Base and other military units on July 15, as well as the preparations made in this context, should be examined.

The written response submitted by MIT to the Parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission contains information confirming the aforementioned points.[1] The statement in this document that "intelligence could not be gathered within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)" does not reflect reality. Evidence folders from the main trial case file include profiling lists created by MIT targeting TSK personnel and generals.[2] Why did MIT feel the need to conceal this fact in its official statement?

In the document, it is stated:

"On July 15, 2016, around 14:20, an individual who arrived at the Organization's Headquarters and, due to having no prior contact with our organization, underwent the necessary security procedures (identity verification, background check, etc.), was interviewed around 15:30. This individual provided unverified raw information suggesting that 'some individuals at the Army Aviation School were planning an attack on the MIT Undersecretary.'" However, Major Osman Karacan, who claimed to have gone to MIT and whose statement was reflected in the press but not included in the file, stated that he mentioned not only the attack on the MIT Undersecretary by some individuals at the Army Aviation School but also that the matter was much larger and even suggested the possibility of a coup. Why does MIT conceal this fact in its official statement?

Additionally, in the written response from MIT, it is noted:

"The Chief of General Staff issued an order through the General Staff Operations Center to ban flights of aerial vehicles nationwide until checks at the Army Aviation School were completed."

"The Undersecretary contacted the Chief of the President's Security Detail, and upon learning that the President was unavailable, asked the Chief of Security whether there was anything unusual and if they were prepared for potential threats. After the Chief of Security stated that there were no abnormalities and that security measures were in place, the Undersecretary continued to wait at the Chief of General Staff's office for news from the Commander of the Land Forces. Upon receiving no information confirming the attack report from the Land Forces Commander, the Undersecretary left the General Staff Headquarters at 20:20 due to his scheduled meeting with the former President of the Syrian National Coalition, Moaz al-Khatib, at MIT Headquarters at 20:30." Why did Hakan Fidan leave the General Staff Headquarters despite the importance of this report and the situation? In the written response submitted by MIT to the Parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission, it is mentioned that the President's Chief of Security stated there were no abnormalities and that security measures were in place. However, Serkan Yazıcı, the manager of the Marmaris Hotel who was with the Chief of Security at the time, testified to the Parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission that after this phone call, the Chief of Security returned to the hotel in great panic and excitement.

The same document also includes information suggesting that MIT had prepared both in military and civilian areas prior to July 15, including areas under the jurisdiction of the TSK. Analyzing the information provided in the written response:

It can be understood that the so-called coup attempt on July 15 was not countered by the TSK, with 98.5% of its personnel still in service, or the General Directorate of Security, with 99.5% of its personnel still active, but rather as part of a controlled plan directed by MIT. It can be said that MIT played the leading role and directed the activities.

While the TSK and the General Directorate of Security appeared paralyzed during the crisis, how was MIT able to take such swift measures? Is this possible without prior preparation?

The document mentions that critical points were equipped with effective weapons, new weapon combinations including air defense elements, personnel capable of operating in the field, effective land-to-air defense systems, the coordination of closing Ankara's airspace to all flights, armored vehicles, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and air defense missiles. How and when did these air defense systems and heavy weapons become part of an intelligence organization like MIT's inventory? What was MIT preparing for? When was this preparation made?

It is stated that on the night of the coup and in the subsequent process, five critical points were secured with air and anti-tank defense systems, air defense missiles, anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft guns, operating on a 24/7 basis. These weapons require at least a two-person crew. The security of all these facilities within the scope of air and anti-tank defense would require a unit of weapons and personnel equivalent to at least an Air Defense Battalion. While this could only be achieved using TSK capabilities, how did MIT acquire this power? Why? From where and which country were these weapons obtained? Were they taken from the TSK? Is there a record of this in the TSK inventory? Control of Turkish airspace falls under the authority of the Prime Ministry. Why did the Prime Minister grant this authority to MIT, as stated in MIT's written response, and why was the airspace control measure not coordinated with the TSK?

Can it be said that the assassination team targeting the Prime Minister in Kastamonu Ilgaz consisted of MIT personnel and that the vehicles used belonged to MIT? No lawsuit or investigation has been initiated regarding the assassination attempt on the Prime Minister. However, then-Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım stated, "An armed attack was carried out against me and my convoy; they tried to kill me." Is there an explanation for this situation?

Special Forces Commander Major General Zekai Aksakallı stated that he only met with Sadık Üstün and Kemal Eskintan, but he did not mention or concealed his phone conversations with the MIT Undersecretary. However, MIT's official statement says that the MIT Undersecretary maintained constant contact with the Minister of Interior, the Director-General of Security, and the Special Forces Commander to coordinate activities to suppress the coup. Why did the Special Forces Commander feel the need to conceal this?

Why has MIT been equipped with the capabilities and resources for a special operations unit, which is exclusively under the purview of the TSK according to laws and regulations? Can it be said that the President did not trust the TSK?

Was MIT not preparing for a potential coup but rather creating the groundwork to execute everything planned post-July 15 and cause major chaos in the country? Considering the "One-Man Regime" established after July 15, can it be concluded that the order was given by President Erdoğan?

Umut GÜÇLÜER

References:

[1] Written response dated 22.05.2017 and numbered 10.000.06.000.105.2/50-97549206, submitted by the National Intelligence Organization to the Parliamentary Investigation Commission established to investigate the Coup Attempt of July 15, 2016, in all its aspects.

[2] Evidence folders titled “YAŞ ÇALIŞMALARI” in the 384th folder, § 209 in the 222nd folder PDF, and 322nd folder PDF in the main trial case file No. 2017/109 of Ankara's 17th High Criminal Court.