The Evaluation of the Special Force Team's Intervention to Ömer Halisdemir

The Evaluation of the Special Force Team's Intervention to Ömer Halisdemir Within the Framework of Military Doctrine and Field Manuals

On the night of July 15, Sergeant Major Ömer Halisdemir had approached Brigadier General Semih Terzi, who was walking toward the Special Forces Headquarters Command Building from the helipad, and fired 3 lethal shots from behind. After this sudden event in the form of an ambush, while Halisdemir was running towards the wooded area with a loaded gun, the team personnel took action to eliminate this sudden development with a reaction that lasted 7 seconds. In this article, the actions of this team, who were declared traitors by certain fractions, will be analyzed within the framework of military doctrines.

When the American field manuals (please find here) and the Turkish Armed Forces’ manuals (KKT31-3 İç Güvenlik Kol Harekâtı (pp. 6-22),  KKT31-1 Komando Birlikleri Harekâtı (pp. 8-30)) prepared in parallel with them are examined;

The statements of "when the personnel are faced with a sudden fire (ambush), they should immediately open counter fire without delay, take the position to protect themselves, use fragmentation grenades to put pressure on the opposite side and smoke grenades to prevent them from being seen" are repeated frequently in all basic principles. In this context, in the commando and special forces trainings given to the units that will participate in counter-terrorism operations, what should be done gradually in case of exposure to far or close fire is repeatedly explained and trained. Moreover, the trainings are repeated frequently to make it a regular practice. In these trainings, in order to measure the reaction and readiness level of their troops, the commanding officers give sudden orders such as “fire from 3 direction” or “ambush” to turn their reactions into a conditioned reflex in the personnel. Also, from time to time, while the troop is moving, using training grenades, personnel are trained to be reactive not only to command but also to voice.

In such a case, it is considered that the team or element, which can move the fastest according to the reaction time and can escape from the fire zone in the most appropriate way, is in the most prepared state for battle. In this respect, it is inevitable that the Special Forces Team personnel will be the most prepared and the most educated personnel when compared to other units.

Again, in another chapter on this subject in the above-mentioned field manuals;

It is possible to find the following statements: “In order to break away from the death zone—the place where the intense fire was exposed, the personnel who are exposed to close and deadly fire (ambush, etc.) must immediately shoot back and get out of that area with the technique of fire and movement.”

In addition, considering that the Special Forces Team was engaged in anti-terrorism activities in Hatay before coming to Ankara and that they went to Diyarbakır for an operation, within the psychology of preparation for the operation, their reactions to fire with fire are always very natural and instinctive. It should also be considered that (1) the team personnel were in complete ambiguity while coming from Diyarbakır to Ankara since they were not even given a preliminary order, at least in accordance with the principles of the Continental Dispatch and Administration Procedure (VÖTGKPHT); (2) when they reached the Oğulbey Barracks, there was no light around to see who may have opened fire in the sight conditions of 02.16 at night; (3) and while approaching the headquarters building, all team personnel, except for one or two members of the team, remained behind and their viewing angle was narrow and inadequate.

In light of these principles;

- It is quite natural for the Special Forces Team personnel to always act in light of the doctrines and instructions stated above, in a conditioned status ready for operation or conflict.

- Within the scope of the order and warning as “get the guns fully loaded, be ready to fight below” by the Team Commander Ahmet Kemal Yilmaz before getting off the plane, the personnel were led to think that they may be subjected to combat with fire on landing (the order in question is not an illegal order. If it were unlawful, Ahmet Kemal Yilmaz would have been arrested on the occasion of giving this order).

- Within the framework of the doctrine of "immediate fire response against sudden fire, pressure and escape from the death zone", which is accepted all over the world in Special Forces and Commando trainings,

- Since they did not know who fired at them in the middle of the night and they were in their own troops, there was no indication that they would encounter fire.

It is considered that they opened fire with the aim of protecting themselves — for self-defense — and that this is natural according to the current laws and their level of training.