Statements of Mehmet Eymür and Connections of Kemal Eskintan with 15 July

This was a subject that I had thought about for a long time, but could not find how to start. Mehmet Eymür's statements about July 15 paved the way for me.

What was Mehmet Eymur saying; “July 15 is a derailed MIT project”. This statement was actually the most important statement of the year. People expected this statement from Sedat Peker, but this statement came from the person he was supposed to make.

Because Mehmet Eymür was a person who held important positions at the MIT. Of course, you will ask; you write from time to time, documents are revealed from time to time, some statements come out from time to time, even the Prime Minister of the time said "the project I don't like", what could be different about this statement?

Here's what I want to explain: First of all, we know that the preliminary studies of this project were carried out long before July 15, the MIT started preparations, and the lists were prepared in this way. I mentioned this in my last book. I even mentioned these people. But I didn't add a person to these contacts: Kemal Eskintan. I knew this person well. While we were working in Malatya, we used to go together in the same service bus. He was studying Arabic at that time. He is older than me. He was a transportation officer. He was a respectful, good-looking man. I also had sincerity with him.

Later I left Malatya. Years later, when I was transferred to the Military Court of the General Staff, this person was appointed to the General Staff Headquarters. We continued to talk there. There was even a slander that a captain had thrown at him, and he asked my opinion. I also helped him by guiding him. Then they took him from the headquarters. I was transferred to AYIM. He got retired. He came to visit me after he retired. But at this time, he was in the position of Head of Department at MIT. He invited me a couple of times, but I didn't go. I politely declined his invitation. Because I was a judge and I thought it would cause misunderstandings. However, while I was idling my relations, people such as Judge Colonel Metin Ulukangil and Judge Colonel Kenan Kenan continued their ties with him. Later, I learned that Colonel Kenan Kenan communicated with him frequently and conveyed information. At this time, Colonel Kenan Kenan was meeting with the pro-AKP generals at the Headquarters. At the same time, he kept in touch with this person, and therefore with the MIT. So, it was a process where lists began to form. With this way of working, they had established a parallel line. They were detecting what was going on in the TAF and making filings. Their close relations with the generals who were still on duty had been effective in tagging the generals. While I was in prison, I came across a few MIT employees and asked about Kemal Eskintan. I wanted to learn about his activities at MIT. They said that there were kidnappings at the beginning of his activities before 15 July. They even said that his future was bright and that he could head the MIT in the future.

Combining the information I received from the MIT employees I met inside, and therefore the activities of Kemal Eskintan with the works of Kenan Kenan and Metin Ulukangil, I managed to capture the important points of the project.

After I was released, I heard Kemal Eskintan's voice as I was walking briskly by Ankara CEPA for a while, but when I remembered the statements of the MIT members inside for a moment, I looked away at him from the corner of my eye and left. He noticed me too, but he too looked at me out of the corner of his eye. There were two guards with him. In the following days, I came across his name in the events in Libya, in the smuggling of weapons to Syria and in many MİT operations. Five or six months before July 15, Colonel Kenan Kenan's rhetoric and connections such as "Look, parallelists will stage a coup," and Kemal Eskintan's relationship began to settle down. Thus, the important pillars of the project began to emerge. Many more like him prepared the ground for this issue by forming sentences such as: “look and you will see … .” It is such a project that one of the two generals in the same situation was investigated, then a decision of non-prosecution was given, and the other was given a life sentence.

It is such a project that one of the two staff colonels in the same situation was given a life sentence and the other was dismissed of all changes. In fact, one or two people who got in by accident were released within two or three months. Since the Doğu Perinçek team has a clear partnership in this project, it is necessary to look at the "derailment" from this point of view. The first helicopter that went to pick up the Prime Minister on the day of the incident got into combat, but there was even no investigation about it. As I understand it, the derailment has taken place here. They actually went to take him, but then for some reason they gave up and broke up. There is also the claim that the planned deaths as of that day were thousands or even tens of thousands, but since I could not find effective evidence to fully confirm them, I will not go into them.

As of that day, there were people who were aware of this project and were arrogant and seemed to be valiant. There were also those who reacted as if it was a real coup. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu assumed that it was really a coup and displayed the usual attitude. However, people from the same party who were aware of the project gave different reactions. Just like when they voted against the referral of the five ministers to the Supreme Court.

Now let's ask again: if there was a coup attempt, why did you try to eliminate the report prepared by the Coup Investigation Commission?

If there was a coup attempt, why didn't the head of MIT go and tell the commission what happened? Why didn't Hulusi Akar go and testify?

Hulusi Akar has the title of complainant even in the indictment against me. I also asked him to be heard at the trial. While I was serving as a member of the AYİM as a Judge Colonel, I was investigated and arrested on the charge of coup. On the other hand, the person who was the Chief of General Staff on that day complains about me, let alone prevent the events.

What was the Kemal Eskintan Sedat Peker relationship? Who was doing this kind of coordination as of that day? What kind of plot was set up to mobilize some generals?

How did they put some generals on the list to be arrested, whose names were nowhere to be found but who did not obey them? How did they get these generals to act?

Answers to these questions are one of the important pillars of the project in question.

Dr.Cemil CELIK